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PREEMPTING PLAINTIFF CITIES
By Sarah L. Swan*
ABSTRACT

Within the city-state relationship, states hold an enormous amount
of power. Recently, states have been using that power to pass
extremely aggressive preemption laws that prohibit cities’ regulatory
efforts on many fronts. These new preemption laws most commonly
occur in the context of red states limiting the regulatory scope of blue
cities, inflaming those already tense city-state relationships and
cutting into what many view as the appropriate scope of local
autonomy.
But despite this intense clash in the regulatory sphere, when we
move away from the world of city regulation and toward the world of
city litigation, things look surprisingly different. Although cities have
been bringing forward hundreds of quite controversial claims against
corporate wrongdoers for harms ranging from the subprime mortgage
crisis to the opioid epidemic, such plaintiff city litigation has provoked
relatively little state hostility. States have not ratcheted up their
response to this exercise of city power in at all the same way as they
have for regulation. Rather, states have shown a remarkably limited
appetite for preempting plaintiff city litigation.
What accounts for these differing responses? Three main factors
are likely in play. First, while regulatory preemption is largely the
result of intense political polarization, states have historically viewed
litigation against corporate wrongdoers in less partisan terms. Both
blue and red states have themselves engaged in this type of litigation,
and there is thus an institutional tradition of flexibility in this context.
Second, and relatedly, the issues at the heart of plaintiff city litigation
are often not as politically divisive as those at the heart of the
*
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preempted regulations. Harms like lead paint poisoning and the
opioid epidemic have attracted widespread condemnation, while
many of the regulation preemption subjects remain hotly contested.
Finally, unlike regulation, litigation is not an obvious instrument of
governance. It has unpredictable outcomes, it is not an exclusively
governmental power, and it relies on existing law.
Since plaintiff city litigation operates mostly outside of state
crosshairs, it can provide a space for cities looking to pursue
progressive goals. Plaintiff city litigation may not achieve the same
immediate governance goals as regulation, but it does have significant
political benefits for cities and their residents. Thus, even in an era of
rampant regulatory preemption and deep political animosity between
cities and states, plaintiff city litigation presents a viable parallel track
for cities to continue their pursuit of urban social justice. Although
such litigation does not directly address the contentious issues
forming the basis of regulatory battles, it does offer a means of
protecting vulnerable communities and advancing goals of democratic
equality in other ways.
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INTRODUCTION
Within the city-state relationship, states hold enormous power.1
Lately, states have been exercising that power by passing extremely
broad, extremely aggressive laws that preempt and prohibit cities’
regulatory efforts on many fronts.2
Variously called “hyper
preemption,”3 the “new preemption,”4 “super preemption,”5 “nuclear
preemption,”6 or “maximum preemption,”7 these new state efforts
remove significant regulatory authority from cities, and typically
function to stop municipalities from enacting socially progressive or
liberal-leaning regulation.8 They occur in a wide variety of contexts,
targeting everything from sprinklers and plastic bags, to minimum
wage ordinances, and anti-discrimination laws.9
While “conflicts between statehouses and city halls” are nothing
new,10 these new preemption laws dramatically differ from the old
ones in both quantity and quality. Quantitatively, preemption activity
has increased significantly every year since 2011, and shows no signs
of slowing down.11 In fact, given that conservative political groups
like the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) offer and

1. Richard C. Schragger, The Attack on American Cities, 96 TEX. L. REV. 1163,
1165 (2018).
2. See id.
3. Erin Scharff, Hyper Preemption: A Reordering of the State and Local
Relationship?, 106 GEO. L.J. 1469, 1473 (2018).
4. Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1995, 1997 (2018).
5. Simon Davis-Cohen, The Latest Weapon Against Local Democracy? “Super
Preemption,” PROGRESSIVE (Mar. 8, 2018), http://progressive.org/dispatches/superpreemption-local-democracy-180308/ [https://perma.cc/6MNP-GACC].
6. Briffault, supra note 4.
7. Lori Riverstone-Newell, The Rise of State Preemption Laws in Response to
Local Policy Innovation, 47 PUBLIUS 403, 405 (2017).
8. Briffault, supra note 4, at 1997, 1998.
9. Id. at 1999–2002; see also Lauren E. Phillips, Note, Impeding Innovation:
State Preemption of Progressive Local Regulations, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2225, 2242–
43 (2017).
10. William D. Hicks et al., Home Rule Be Damned: Exploring Policy Conflicts
Between the Statehouse and City Hall, 51 AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N 26, 26 (2018).
11. Riverstone-Newell, supra note 7, at 406. Indeed, “2015 saw ‘more efforts to
undermine local control on more issues than any other year in history.’” Id. (quoting
Brendan Fischer, Corporate Interests Take Aim at Local Democracy, PR WATCH
(Feb. 3, 2016, 10:26 AM), https://www.prwatch.org/news/2016/02/13029/2016-ALEClocal-control [https://perma.cc/9GA6-NQJE]).
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encourage the use of preemption law templates,12 preemption activity
is only expected to grow.
Qualitatively, the new preemption laws differ from the old in a
number of ways. First, the new preemption laws are punitive.13
Individual local officials can be sued, fined, or removed (or some
combination of all three) for trying to enact regulations in prohibited
fields.14 Local governments can also be fiscally penalized for such
attempts, either through the withholding of state funds, or through
fines.15 Second, some new preemption laws fundamentally alter what
steps local governments can take to challenge state preemption.16 In
part because of these features, preemption laws have been the source
of intense consternation, and are a site of deepening animosity
between state and local governments.17
Given the high-intensity city-state conflict evident in regulatory
preemption, it is perhaps surprising that when we move away from
the world of city regulation and into the world of city litigation, things
look drastically different. Cities have increasingly been using
litigation, in addition to regulation, as a tool to achieve progressive
ends and have been bringing forward hundreds of quite controversial
claims against corporate wrongdoers in contexts like the opioid
epidemic, the financial crisis, lead paint poisoning, and climate
change.18 Yet states have not responded with anywhere near the fury
that they have displayed on the regulatory front. Rather, states have
adopted a relatively restrained approach to city litigation, and much
city litigation continues unimpeded by state intervention.19
12. Id. at 405–06; Kriston Capps, The Cities that Are Fighting Back Against State
Intervention, CITYLAB (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/10/citiesfighting-back-against-state-intervention/502232/ [https://perma.cc/5VE2-KSR6]; see,
e.g., Living Wage Mandate Preemption Act, AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCH. COUNCIL (Jan.
28, 2013), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/living-wage-mandate-preemption-act/
[https://perma.cc/JN93-AH3X] (providing a model preemption statute for minimum
wage ordinances).
13. Phillips, supra note 9, at 2247.
14. Lisa Gonzalez, Infographic: The Threat of Super-Preemption to US Cities,
INST. FOR LOC. SELF-RELIANCE (May 11, 2017), https://ilsr.org/infographic-the-threatof-super-preemption-to-us-cities/ [https://perma.cc/RR2V-92EM].
15. Phillips, supra note 9, at 2247, 2250.
16. Id. at 2250.
17. See Abby Rapoport, Blue Cities, Red States, AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 22, 2016),
http://prospect.org/article/blue-cities-battle-red-states [https://perma.cc/YYK9-L8N8].
18. See Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff Cities, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1227, 1285–86 (2018).
States sometimes also bring litigation targeting these harms, but cities are motivated
to maintain their own lawsuits for a number of reasons. Id. at 1272–73.
19. See discussion infra Part II.
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This Article addresses this paradox. It describes the current state
of city litigation preemption, explains the reasons why states have
been relatively non-confrontational in this area, and argues that even
in this era of rampant regulatory preemption, plaintiff city litigation
presents a viable means of accomplishing certain progressive goals.
While the possibility of litigation preemption battles constantly looms
over plaintiff city litigation, city litigation is often in the shared
interest of both cities and states. Such interest alignment suggests
that plaintiff city litigation may well continue to escape the fate of
preempted regulation.
Part I of this Article descriptively maps the litigation preemption
landscape. It sets out the means by which states can preempt city
litigation and explores the instances in which states have done so.
This Part shows that while there have been strong state-city
disagreements over plaintiff city litigation, to date, litigation
preemption has not undergone nearly the same kind of aggressive
overhaul as regulatory preemption. Indeed, in a number of recent
examples, states have actually backed down from legal confrontations
with cities over such litigation.20
Part II explains why city litigation has thus far been mostly spared
the venomous state response that has befallen regulation. First, the
new regulatory preemption is largely the result of extreme political
polarization—specifically Republican-led states clashing with
Democratic-led cities.21 This political dynamic is muted in the
litigation context. States themselves have a history of engaging in
bipartisan litigation against third-party wrongdoers and have long
been able to overlook partisan differences when it comes to
litigation.22 Institutionally, such historical flexibility likely enables
states to avoid myopic political entrenchment about city litigation as
well. States and cities are typically compelled to expend enormous
resources as a result of the litigated harms,23 and where there is a
possibility of recouping some of this expense, states are able to look
past their ideological differences in favor of a shared benefit for all.

20. See discussion infra Part II.
21. Briffault, supra note 4; Riverstone-Newell, supra note 7, at 406; Vladimir
Kogan, Means, Motives, and Opportunities in the New Preemption Wars, 51 PS: POL.
SCI. & POL. 28, 28–29 (2018).
22. PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND
NATIONAL POLICY MAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 28 (2015).
23. See, e.g., Swan, supra note 18, at 1242 (discussing costs to cities arising from
the opioid epidemic).
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Second, the issues that cities litigate are often much less politically
polarizing than those that they regulate.
There is general,
widespread, bipartisan agreement that the opioid epidemic, lead paint
poisoning, and the sub-prime mortgage crisis are serious harms.24
Conversely, there is much less agreement on issues like sanctuary
cities, local minimum wage laws, and the appropriate scope of antidiscrimination laws.25
Third, while regulation is obviously a form of governance, litigation
is a much subtler tool.26 Litigation is more commonly viewed as a
form of law enforcement, rather than law creation, and in that sense,
it appears non-threatening to those who prefer maintenance of the
status quo to progressive change. Plaintiff city litigation does have
important political functions, in that it helps to define polities and
sends valuable expressive messages,27 but it does not implicate
questions of governing power the way regulation does.
Part III explores the political possibilities for plaintiff city
litigation. Although such litigation does not address the contentious
issues forming the basis of regulatory battles, it does, as I have argued
earlier, offer a means of protecting vulnerable communities in other
ways.28 Thus, even in an era of rampant regulatory preemption and
deep political animosity between cities and states, plaintiff city
litigation currently remains a viable parallel track for cities to
continue pursuing urban social justice.
I. FORMS OF LITIGATION PREEMPTION
Just as states can preempt and prohibit city regulation, they can
also preempt and prohibit plaintiff city litigation. This Part describes

24. Indeed, states themselves engaged in bipartisan litigation against the major
banks for their role in creating the mortgage crisis. States are also investigating the
opioid manufacturers. Press Release, Eric Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y Gen., N.Y.
Att’y Gen.’s Press Office, A.G. Schneiderman, Bipartisan Coalition of AGs Expand
Multistate Investigation into Opioid Crisis (Sept. 19, 2017), https://ag.ny.gov/pressrelease/ag-schneiderman-bipartisan-coalition-ags-expand-multistate-investigationopioid-crisis [https://perma.cc/428N-QD48].
Many states passed regulations
governing lead paint remediation and treatment. Katrina S. Korfmacher & Michael
L. Hanley, Are Local Laws the Key to Ending Childhood Lead Poisoning?, 38 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y & L. 757, 757 (2013).
25. However, there are preemption laws over seemingly innocuous areas like
plastic bags and sprinklers as well. Briffault, supra note 4.
26. See NOLETTE, supra note 22, at 163 (describing litigation as only “subtly
regulatory”).
27. See Swan, supra note 18, at 1285.
28. Id.
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the means by which states preempt plaintiff city litigation: namely, by
entering into settlements that preclude cities from litigating, directly
suing cities to stop plaintiff city litigation, and by passing legislation
that prohibits such litigation.
A. State Settlements that Preclude City Claims
State-city preemption can occur through state settlements with
third parties. The best example of this arose in the tobacco litigation
context, when state-initiated tobacco litigation ultimately resulted in
the Master Settlement Agreement (the “MSA”), one of the largest
civil settlements in American history.29 The story of this preemptionby-settlement actually begins with a story of typical, standard
regulatory preemption. In 1985, Florida, influenced heavily by the
tobacco lobby, became the first state to preempt local smoking laws.30
But soon after this regulatory preemption occurred, the tobacco
lobby’s fortunes changed, as states (and two cities) began to sue
tobacco companies in the late 1980s.31 When the MSA was eventually
signed, it both ended the existing litigation and functioned as a form
of litigation preemption for cities that did not join the initial
litigation.32 It precluded prospective plaintiff cities from litigation
harms caused by tobacco.33
As “creatures of the state,” municipalities and other sub-state
governmental entities “have only those powers granted to them by
the state.”34 Accordingly, in the MSA, many state attorneys general
could agree not only to relinquish their own future legal claims
against the tobacco industry, but also those of their municipalities and

29. The estimated value at the time of settlement was $105 billion. David M.
Cutler et al., The Economic Impacts of the Tobacco Settlement, 21 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1, 1 (2002).
30. Preemption of Smokefree Air Laws in Florida, AM. FOR NONSMOKERS’
RIGHTS,
http://www.protectlocalcontrol.org/docs/Florida%
20preemption%
20factsheet_2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q4LM-UY6M].
31. Id.
32. Peter Enrich, The Preclusive Effect of the MSA on Future Actions by State
and Local Governments Against Participating Manufacturers, in THE MULTISTATE
MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND THE FUTURE OF STATE AND LOCAL
TOBACCO CONTROL: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED TOPICS AND PROVISIONS OF THE
MULTISTATE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT OF NOVEMBER 23, 1998 37 (Graham
Kelder & Patricia Davidson eds., 1999).
33. Id.
34. Enrich, supra note 32, at 39.
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other sub-state governmental entities.35 So when Wayne County,
Michigan, for example, filed a suit against tobacco companies shortly
after the MSA was signed, the County’s case was dismissed on the
basis that the state attorney general had released the tobacco
defendants from the County’s potential claims.36 Wayne County was
thus unable to seek or obtain compensation for its alleged tobacco
related injuries.37
However, not every state was able to so easily preclude its
municipalities from initiating tobacco suits. The authority of state
attorneys general to bind their municipalities ultimately depends on
state law, and states’ laws differ.38 Accordingly, at least one city, St.
Louis, successfully defeated a preclusion challenge when it launched a
suit against tobacco.39 The MSA, though, foresaw and prepared for
this potential complication. It incorporated terms to minimize the
effect of such plaintiff city suits, and included a provision that deducts
any damages a locality might recover from those received by the
state.40 The MSA also explicitly gives states the right to intervene in
such city suits.41 The MSA thus leaves states well-incentivized and
well-equipped to deter any potential city suits that they did not have
overt authority under state law to prohibit.42

35. Id. States could not, however, “release private claims for compensation due
to injuries from smoking. As the Georgia Supreme Court stated, for purposes of
preclusion in a private suit following a state parens (patriae) action, ‘the State and its
citizens can be privies . . . only with regard to public claims; they cannot be privies
with regard to private claims.’” Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and
Private Rights, 100 MINN. L. REV. 2313, 2344 (2016).
36. In Re: Certified Question from the U.S. District Court Wayne County v.
Philip Morris, 638 N.W.2d 409 (Mich. 2002); see also Daniel Fisher, Cities vs. States:
A Looming Battle for Control of High-Stakes Opioid Litigation, FORBES (Mar. 28,
2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalnewsline/2018/03/28/cities-vs-states-alooming-battle-for-control-of-high-stakes-opioid-litigation/#6c463e074b5d
[https://perma.cc/h63h-t8pe].
37. In Re: Certified Question from the U.S. Dist. Ct. Wayne Cty. v. Philip Morris ,
638 N.W.2d at 411.
38. Id.
39. See City of St. Louis v. American Tobacco., 70 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (E.D. Mo.
1999). Ultimately, approximately thirteen years after the suit was filed, the case was
heard before a jury, and the City lost. See Kelsey Volkmann, Jury Sides with Big
Tobacco over Missouri Hospitals, ST. LOUIS BUS. J. (Apr. 29, 2011),
https://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/2011/04/29/jury-sides-with-big-tobaccoover.html [https://perma.cc/6KJD-4V83].
40. Enrich, supra note 32, at 39–40.
41. Id. at 40.
42. Id.
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State-City Lawsuits

States may also seek court orders to stop city litigation. For
example, in State v. City of Dover,43 two New Hampshire cities,
Dover and Portsmouth, brought suit against various defendants for
the harms caused by the gasoline additive MTBE.44 New Hampshire,
though, had already brought an MTBE suit, and it sued to have the
cities’ suits stopped. New Hampshire claimed that the Cities’ lawsuit
was redundant,45 while the two cities claimed that their lawsuit was
necessary because the New Hampshire suit failed to represent their
interests.46 Specifically, the Cities argued that the state suit did not
sue enough defendants, did not incorporate all the viable liability
theories, sought different remedies from the city suit, and was
vulnerable to specific regulatory defenses that were exclusive to the
state, but not relevant to the cities.47 These arguments failed to
convince the New Hampshire Supreme Court.48 The court held that
the Cities’ suit “must yield” to the State’s suit, because the State had
parens patriae standing to bring its claim, and there was “no reason to
conclude” that it would not adequately represent the cities’
interests.49
Arkansas also recently sought to preempt city litigation through a
court order. The State of Arkansas initiated an opioid lawsuit against

43. 891 A.2d 524 (N.H. 2006). See also the discussion of this case in Margaret
Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys
General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 521–22 (2012), and in Swan, supra note 18, at 1273.
44. MTBE, which stands for methyl tertiary butyl ether, makes the water supply
odorous and terrible to taste, and it may cause cancer. See Elizabeth Thornburg,
Public as Private and Private as Public: MTBE Litigation in the United States , in
CLASS ACTIONS IN CONTEXT: HOW CULTURE, ECONOMICS AND POLITICS SHAPE
COLLECTIVE LITIGATION 342, 344 (Deborah R. Hensler et al. eds., 2016).
45. 891 A.2d 524 (N.H. 2006).
46. Id. at 531.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 534.
49. See also State of New Hampshire v. Hess Corporation, 20 A.3d 212 (N.H.
2011). In Hess, the court equated the Cities’ initiation of a lawsuit in Dover to an
intervention in an existing law suit. The court suggested that in Dover, the applicable
test should have been the one set out in Envtl Def. Fund, Inc. v. Higginson:
“Higginson held that a person or entity seeking to maintain a separate suit, as the
cities here seek to do, must overcome the ‘presumption of adequate representation.
A minimal showing that the representation is inadequate is not sufficient. The
applicant for intervention must demonstrate that its interest is in fact different from
that of the state and that that interest will not be represented by the state.’” Dover,
891 A.2d at 531 (quoting Env’t Defense Fund, Inc. v. Higginson, 631 F.2d 738, 740
(D.C. Cir. 1979)).
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three defendants, but a consortium of fifteen cities and seventy-five
counties launched their own lawsuit, in which they sued
approximately sixty defendants. Notably, they also included the State
as a plaintiff.50 The Arkansas State Attorney General petitioned the
Supreme Court, seeking a finding that only the state’s Attorney
General’s Office had the authority to bring forward opioid
litigation.51 In the Attorney General’s own words, her petition was
“about who represents the people and the State of Arkansas.”52 In
April 2018, the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected the Attorney
General’s petition, issuing a “one-sentence denial” rebuffing the
claim.53
C.

Preemption through Legislation: Implied, Express, and Super

Another path to preempting litigation is legislative, as states have
broad powers to legislatively preempt plaintiff city litigation. This
broad legislative power operates in three main ways: through implied
preemption, through express preemption, and sometimes, through

50. David Ramsey, Attorney General Leslie Rutledge in Spat with Cities and
Counties over Opioid Lawsuits, ARK. BLOG (Apr. 4, 2018, 11:44 PM),

https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2018/04/04/attorney-general-leslierutledge-in-spat-with-cities-and-counties-over-opioid-lawsuits
[https://perma.cc/VW3F-Q9YZ].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. David Ramsey, State Supreme Court Denies Attorney General Leslie
Rutledge’s Request to Pull Prosecutor from Opioid Lawsuit, ARK. BLOG (Apr. 6,
2018, 8:00 PM), https://www.arktimes.com/ArkansasBlog/archives/2018/04/06/statesupreme-court-denies-attorney-general-leslie-rutledges-request-to-pull-prosecutorfrom-opioid-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/68FS-K785]. The court’s ruling consisted of a
statement that the “petitioner’s emergency petition for writ of mandamus is denied,”
but gave virtually no explanation as to the grounds for the dismissal. See Wesley
Brown, AG Rutledge Loses ‘Writ of Mandamus’ Request, Second Opioid Lawsuit
May Proceed with ‘State Actor,’ TALK BUS. & POL. (Apr. 6, 2018, 4:29 PM),
https://talkbusiness.net/2018/04/ag-rutledge-loses-writ-of-mandamus-request-secondopioid-lawsuit-may-proceed-with-state-actor/ [https://perma.cc/6WYG-9YG2]. But
in Alabama, a court dismissed a case filed by a district attorney after the state
attorney general filed a “notice of dismissal.” Ex parte King, 59 So. 3d 21 (Ala.
2010), discussed in NAAG, Decisions Affecting the Powers and Duties of State
Attorneys
General,
4
NAA
GAZETTE
10
(2010),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR3T-BU4G]. (noting that the district attorney “pointed
to no rule or statute that permits a district attorney, in the exercise of [] duties, to
disregard the direction, control, and instruction of the attorney general . . . . Where,
as here, the attorney general clearly directs and instructs that litigation on behalf of
the State be dismissed, his instructions in that regard take precedence over a district
attorney’s desire to proceed with the action.”).
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super preemption. First, states and private parties can make implied
preemption arguments, claiming that state legislation which does not
directly or obviously target city litigation nevertheless preempts it.
Second, states can use express preemption and pass legislation that
clearly and obviously prohibits city litigation. Third, some new
“super preemption” laws may technically prohibit litigation (though
they tend to exist in areas where litigation is already uncommon).

1.

Implied Preemption

Implied preemption provides one way that legislation can preempt
plaintiff city litigation. Implied preemption occurs when states or
private parties argue that a particular piece of state legislation
prohibits city action, even though the legislation does not expressly
articulate or offer “clear guidance” regarding the preemption being
argued.54 Implied preemption played an important role in the
plaintiff city litigation over the sub-prime mortgage crisis, as banks
and financial institutions frequently argued (mostly successfully) that
cities could not bring suit against them for the consequences of the
sub-prime mortgage crisis because state legislation implicitly
preempted such municipal claims.55
Many courts agreed with the banks’ arguments that the statutory
wording at issue meant that the State had intended to occupy the
field, and thereby prevent cities from both regulating and litigating.56
In City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., for
example, the court said that an Ohio law expressly preempting
municipalities from regulating in the area of mortgage loans also
implicitly included a prohibition on municipal litigation in the area.57
The statute at issue included in its definition of regulation “other
actions taken directly or indirectly,” and the court found that this

54. Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1114, 1116 (2007).
In practice, virtually all implied preemption claims are brought by private parties
seeking to get out from under the regulation. Id.
55. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc., 621 F.
Supp. 2d 513, 517 (N.D. Ohio 2009).
56. “Some plaintiff city suits are also preempted by federal legislation, as was the
case when Los Angeles’s case against JPMorgan for predatory lending was
preempted by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act.”
Swan, supra note 18, at n.325 (citing Jonathan Stempel, JPMorgan Wins Dismissal of
Los
Angeles
Lawsuit
over
Mortgage
Lending,
REUTERS,
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jpmorganchase-losangeles-lawsuitidUSKBN0G62AT20140806 [https://perma.cc/9JD6-9K3A]).
57. 621 F. Supp. 2d at 517–18.
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broad language “preempts more than just traditional legislative and
administrative efforts;” it also encompasses common law based
litigation.58 The court declared:
Without question, common law actions for damages represent an
important manner of regulating conduct [ . . . ] The United States
Supreme Court has recognized that the judicial process can be
viewed as the extension of a government’s regulatory power. [ . . . ]
Given the expansive wording of the statute and the powerful
regulatory potential of common law damage claims, the Court finds
that [the statute] includes common law public nuisance claims like
the one asserted by the City.59

Later, in City of Cincinnati v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.,
the district court found that the City’s public nuisance claims against
the bank were similarly preempted by the Ohio statute reserving
regulatory power over credit to the state.60
Implied preemption also resulted in the dismissal of a lead paint
case in New Jersey. In Re Lead Paint Litigation involved a number
of lead paint companies, which successfully argued that the state Lead
Paint Act and Products Liability Act preempted a public nuisance
claim brought by “twenty-six municipalities and counties.”61 A twojudge dissent, however, disagreed with the four-member majority
opinion, instead arguing that public nuisance “exists independent of
any legislative pronouncement.”62 The dissent found that “[t]he Lead
Paint Act and the public nuisance doctrine” were in fact
“complementary mechanisms aimed at the same evil.”63
As the vociferous dissent in In Re Lead Paint Litigation suggests,
implied litigation preemption arguments are not always wellreceived.64 Some state courts impose a very high bar on implied
preemption arguments, requiring “an express statement of intent to
preempt before any such preemption will be found.”65

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 518.
Id.
897 F. Supp. 2d 633, 640 (S.D. Ohio 2012).
924 A.2d 484, 486–87 (N.J. 2007).
Id. at 508 (Zazzali, J., dissenting).

Id.
Id.

Sarah Fox, Home Rule in an Era of Local Environmental Innovation , 44
ECOLOGY L.Q. 575, 597 n.165. New York and Kansas courts are examples of this. Id.
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Express Preemption

Unlike the ambiguity which drives implied preemption cases, states
sometimes use legislation to expressly and quite clearly prohibit city
litigation.66 This express preemption power is so broad that it may
actually extend to state litigation as well. Ohio’s state legislature
tested the limits of express preemption in the early 2000s. At that
time, many Ohio cities, as well as the State of Ohio, had all brought
suits over lead paint poisoning.67 After the city cases were dismissed,
the Ohio General Assembly passed legislation to terminate the state
litigation.68 The battle over the state litigation went to the Ohio
Supreme Court, and “nearly resulted in a constitutional crisis.”69 In
2009, a new state attorney general chose to voluntarily stop the state
lead paint litigation, thus ending the difficult preemption issue
presented.70
That exceptional case illustrates just how expansive express
preemption powers may be, but the much more common use of
states’ express preemption relates to city litigation.
Express
preemption was a frequent occurrence in the gun litigation context,
where states passed legislation that explicitly preempted city
litigation.71 For example, after New Orleans filed a plaintiff city gun

66. See Diller, supra note 54, at 1115 (noting that, with a few exceptions, for
express preemption “the court’s task is relatively simple: to determine whether the
challenged ordinance falls within the subject matter that the legislature expressly
preempted”).
67. David J. Owsiany, The Rise and Fall of Lead Paint Litigation in Ohio, 1
STATE AG TRACKER (2009), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/the-riseand-fall-of-lead-paint-litigation-in-ohio [https://perma.cc/C7XE-V369].
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Congress also passed the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms
Act, which barred the vast majority of plaintiff city claims against the gun industry. 15
U.S.C. § 7901 (2018). There was, however, some minimal space to make claims. For
example, in City of N.Y v. Bob Moates’ Sport Shop, Inc., 253 F.R.D. 237, 238
(E.D.N.Y. 2008),
[t]he City of New York brought an equitable civil action against out of-state
gun retailers for allegedly creating a public nuisance by illegally and
negligently furnishing firearms to prohibited persons that were then
trafficked into New York City. The court ruled that the PLCAA did not
preempt the city’s claim because the city had alleged and proffered evidence
supporting the conclusion that defendants’ participation in straw purchases
violated predicate federal statutes specifically relating to the sale and
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litigation suit in 1998, the Louisiana legislature passed La. R.S.
40:1799. That statute declared that:
The governing authority of any political subdivision or local or other
governmental authority of the state is precluded and preempted
from bringing suit to recover against any firearms or ammunition
manufacturer, trade association, or dealer for damages for injury,
death, or loss or to seek other injunctive relief resulting from or
relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of
firearms or ammunition. The authority to bring such actions as may
be authorized by law shall be reserved exclusively to the state. 72

In Morial v. Smith & Wesson, the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that this statutory wording did indeed preempt New Orleans’s
existing suit.73 In a similar vein, in Philadelphia v. Beretta, the
Pennsylvania court found that a 1999 amendment to the state
Uniform Firearm Act deprived Philadelphia of the power to sue
because it specifically barred a variety of municipal suits against gun
manufacturers.74 In Sturm v. Atlanta, the Georgia Court of Appeals
reached a similar conclusion based on Georgia’s statutory language.75

marketing of firearms, as well as a predicate state statute declaring that any
unlawfully possessed, transported or disposed handgun is a nuisance.
Gun Industry Immunity, GIFFORDS L. CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/other-laws-policies/gun-industryimmunity/ [https://perma.cc/S6AT-CK5Z].
72. LA. STAT. ANN. § 1799 (1999) (quoted in Morial v. Smith & Wesson, 785 So.
2d 1, 19 (La. 2001)).
73. 785 So. 2d at 21.
74. 126 F. Supp. 2d 882, 890 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
75. 253 S.E.2d 525, 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002). The amendment at issue in Sturm
said:
[t]he authority to bring suit and right to recover against any firearm or
ammunition manufacturer, trade association, or dealer by or on behalf of
any governmental unit created by or pursuant to an Act of the General
Assembly or the Constitution, or any department, agency, or authority
thereof, for damages, abatement, or injunctive relief resulting from or
relating to the lawful design, manufacture, marketing, or sale of firearms or
ammunition to the public shall be reserved exclusively to the state. This
paragraph shall not prohibit a political subdivision or local government
authority from bringing an action against a firearms or ammunition
manufacturer or dealer for breach of contract or warranty as to firearms or
ammunition purchased by the political subdivision or local government
authority.
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-173 (2005). Sturm is also notable in that the State of Georgia
filed an amicus brief, itself arguing that its state legislation had preempted the city
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In some cases, the statutory wording was focused on prohibiting
localities from regulating guns, creating more ambiguity for the
courts. Generally, though, if the statutory language is broad enough,
many courts have held that the legislation could also preempt plaintiff
city gun litigation.76 There is an important exception: one ongoing
case, City of Gary v. Smith & Wesson, has survived a preemption
challenge. In that case, the City of Gary sued firearm manufacturers,
wholesalers, and dealers, bringing claims for public nuisance,
negligent distribution of guns, and negligent design.77 At the trial
level, the court held that the suit was barred by an Indiana statute
prohibiting localities from regulating guns.78 The court of appeals,
however, disagreed. The appellate court distinguished litigation from
regulation, finding that although the relevant section of the Indiana
Code prevented cities from regulating firearms, the City’s lawsuit was
not a form of regulation.79 The court characterized the suit as seeking
“redress under existing state law of nuisance and negligence,”80 and
held that since “Indiana statutes expressly authorize the City to seek
relief against public nuisances,” the plaintiff city claim could
proceed.81 In response, Indiana has enacted legislation that more
explicitly prohibits the litigation.82

3.

Super Preemption

Leaving aside the exception of Gary, the initial state preemption
laws, along with the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms

litigation. 253 S.E.2d at 529. The court characterized the State’s argument as follows:
“[t]he State contends that under Georgia’s Constitution and laws, it alone has the
power to regulate the manufacture, sale, distribution, and promotion of firearms and
the lawsuit is an attempt by the City to usurp the governmental power and authority
of Georgia’s General Assembly. We agree.” Id.
76. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. CV 990153198S, 1999 WL
1241909 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 10, 1999); Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 778 So. 2d
1042, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
77. 801 N.E.2d 1222, 1227 (Ind. 2003).
78. Id. at 1238.
79. Id. at 1239.
80. Id. at 1238.
81. Id. at 1239.
82. See Editorial, Gun Makers’ Pals: State Legislators Defend Industry Against
Suit,
J.
GAZETTE
(July
27,
2018,
1:00
AM),
http://www.journalgazette.net/opinion/20180727/gun-makers-pals
[https://perma.cc/9U8R-R4YU].
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Act, effectively ended municipal gun litigation.83 Thus, the new wave
of firearm “super preemption” laws has little practical effect on the
already essentially non-existent city firearms litigation. Nevertheless,
these “super preemption” statutes, which threaten local officials with
“fines, civil liability, or removal from office for enacting or enforcing
firearms measures,”84 may impact whether plaintiff city gun litigation
could occur in the future.85 Most gun super preemption laws make no
specific reference to litigation; thus, arguments that they do not
preempt litigation are at least theoretically possible. To be sure, in
many instances there will be strong arguments that super preemption
laws do preclude city firearms litigation—many super preemption
laws seem designed to cast as wide a preemption net as possible, and,
as already noted, many courts have held that words like “any activity”
in regulatory preemption statutes include city litigation.86 But other
courts, like the court in Gary, have taken the opposite view.87 Much
turns on the specific statutory wording, and courts in the past have
been sometimes certain and other times less convinced that litigation
should be lumped in with general regulatory activities. 88
One of the problems with super preemption, though, is that it may
prevent these contestations from ever happening. Super preemption
laws are likely to have a chilling effect on the ability of cities to test
the boundaries of litigation preemption.89 If a city considered testing
the limits of the federal Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
or state preemption legislation and engage in litigation against the
firearm industry, the punitive consequences associated with “super
preemption” would almost certainly be a formidable deterrent.90

83. “At present, 34 states provide either blanket immunity to the gun industry in a
way similar to the PLCAA or prohibit cities or other local government entities from
bringing lawsuits against certain gun industry defendants.” Gun Industry Immunity,
supra note 71. “Those states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington and West Virginia.” Id.
84. Briffault, supra note 4, at 2003.
85. Id. at 2004.
86. See, e.g., discussion of City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities,
Inc., at infra Section I.C.1.
87. See City of Gary, 801 N.E.2d at 1238–39.
88. See infra Section I.C.1.
89. Briffault, supra note 4, at 2022.
90. Id. at 2023.
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When the consequences of overstepping the preemption line are so
severe, cities are unlikely to test where it lies.91
II. EXPLAINING LITIGATION NON-PREEMPTION
As the preceding section shows, states can and do engage in
litigation preemption. However, on the whole, states have generally
been relatively restrained in their approach to plaintiff city litigation.
In fact, in recent disputes over opioid litigation, states have refrained
from engaging in a number of potential confrontations with plaintiff
cities.92 Some states have publicly expressed displeasure with cities’
litigation efforts against opioid companies and turf wars have
certainly developed, but states have thus far been reluctant to avail
themselves of all the tools in their litigation preemption arsenals.93

91. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01 (2006) is a good example of this type of
law and appears to be a disturbing overreach on the part of the state government.
Section 41-194.01 provides that “[a]t the request of one or more members of the
legislature, the attorney general shall investigate any ordinance, regulation, order or
other official action adopted or taken by the governing body of a county, city or town
that the member alleges violates state law or the Constitution of Arizona.” ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-194.01 (2006). If the State Attorney General finds that there is
indeed a municipal violation of state law, the local government has thirty days “to
resolve the violation,” or it “lose[s] all state funding.” Id.
92. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 96. States have also not been overlyinterested in engaging in litigation preemption in the climate change context. Many
cities have recently engaged in environmental and climate change litigation, including
Boulder, New York City, San Francisco, Oakland, and Richmond (California), as
well as various counties. John Schwartz, Climate Lawsuits, Once Limited to the
Coasts,
Jump
Inland,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Apr.
18,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/climate/exxon-climate-lawsuit-colorado.html
[https://nyti.ms/2JTkYg8]. But between 2012 and 2017, only two states passed
preemption laws directed at climate change – North Carolina in 2012 and Oklahoma
in 2014 – and it is not clear whether these would encompass litigation. See Elizabeth
Daigneau, Will States Stop Cities from Combatting Climate Change? GOVERNING
(Jan.
2017),
http://www.governing.com/topics/transportation-infrastructure/govclimate-change-states-cities-preemption.html [https://perma.cc/5DGH-8HHN]. One
scholar writing in 2018 noted that “state preemption with respect to local climate
policy is still uncommon.” Dorothy M. Daley, Climate Change and State and Local
Governments: Multiple Dimensions of Intergovernmental Conflict, 51 PS: POL. SCI.
& POL. 33 (Jan. 2018). However, at least in the opioid context, more conflicts could
be coming. South Carolina, for instance, “commissioned an opinion from its attorney
general on whether cities and counties had independent standing to file their own
[opioid] suits.” Fisher, supra note 36.
93. Sometimes, cities and states simply adopt different approaches, but do so
amicably. See Swan, supra note 18, at 1272. For an example of differences in
litigating perspectives that appears to be relatively amicable, in which the city of
Dayton sued more opioid defendants, but Ohio seems to have not complained, see
Alan Johnson, Doctors, Cardinal Health Included in Cities’ Lawsuits over Opioid
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A dispute between the City of Reno and the State of Nevada
provides a good example of this dynamic. In the fall of 2017, the
State Attorney General of Nevada sent a letter to the Mayor of Reno,
stating that if Reno went ahead with its stated goal of initiating
litigation against the opioid industry, this plaintiff city litigation would
“undermine Nevada’s position in the multistate investigation” and
“thwart . . . any potential discussions with opioid manufacturers, and
any potential agreements that could uniformly address the opioid
crisis in Nevada.”94 The State Attorney General acknowledged that
the City would be able to make certain exclusive legal claims that the
State could not, but maintained that the State had “primary
jurisdiction” over deceptive trade practices litigation and resources
that the City lacked.95
Reno’s mayor was unmoved by the letter, instead issuing a
statement suggesting that the State and City likely disagreed not only
about how best to pursue opioid litigation, but also about how to use
any settlement funds that might result.96 In her view, the attorney
general’s proposed “unified front” and the mayor’s proposed “multipronged attack” were “not mutually exclusive.”97 Reno voted in
early 2018 to move forward with its litigation.98 Later that year, the
State of Nevada filed its own opioid litigation lawsuit against Purdue

Epidemic,

COLUMBUS
DISPATCH
(June
5,
2017,
10:39
PM),
http://www.dispatch.com/news/20170605/doctors-cardinal-health-included-in-citieslawsuits-over-opioid-epidemic [https://perma.cc/EZC6-EDLF]. Dayton’s city suit
came a week after the state suit that just targeted manufacturers. See Jackie
Borchardt, Dayton, Loraine to Sue Opioid Makers, Drug Distributors and Doctors,
CLEVELAND
(June
5,
2017),
https://www.cleveland.com/metro/index.ssf/2017/06/dayton_lorain_to_sue_opioid_ma.
html [https://perma.cc/BZ4L-Q82P].
94. See Riley Snyder, Laxalt to Schieve: Reno Lawsuit Against Opioid
Manufacturers Could Undermine Ongoing State Litigation , NEV. INDEP. (Nov. 9,
2017, 10:44 PM), https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/laxalt-to-schieve-renolawsuit-against-opioid-manufacturers-could-undermine-ongoing-state-litigation
[https://perma.cc/AJN7-3EQ2].
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Anjeanette Damon, Opioid Lawsuit: Reno Lawyer Makes Bid for the Case If
City
Sues,
RENO
GAZETTE
J.
(Nov.
7,
2017),
https://www.rgj.com/story/news/2017/11/27/opioid-lawsuit-reno-lawyer-makes-bidcase-if-city-sues/899853001/ [https://perma.cc/2HXK-CUQJ].
98. Michael Scott Davidson, Reno Follows Clark County in Using Las Vegas Law
Firm for Opioid Lawsuit, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 10, 2018, 6:24 PM),
https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/politics-and-government/clark-county/renofollows-clark-county-in-using-las-vegas-law-firm-for-opioid-lawsuit/
[https://perma.cc/6EY8-P4W8].
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Pharma, but has not taken further actions opposing Reno.99 Indeed,
the State Attorney General faced significant political heat for the
voiced opposition to the plaintiff city litigation, with an opponent in
the gubernatorial race noting that the attorney general is
“discouraging a City of Reno lawsuit against opioid manufacturers
while taking thousands of dollars in campaign contributions from
those companies.”100 Perhaps because of this dynamic, when Reno
did file its suit in September 2018, Nevada’s Attorney General’s office
issued a conciliatory statement, saying, “We welcome the city of Reno
to the ongoing fight to curb Nevada’s opioid epidemic.”101
A similar turf war ensued between Tennessee and a group of
Tennessee counties. Initially, the Republican State Attorney General
took issue with an opioid lawsuit initiated by forty-seven Tennessee
counties, arguing that it would “impede [his] ability to prosecute all of
the opioid litigation implicating the State’s interests” and that the
counties were wrong to use contingency-fee based private attorneys
to help bring their case.102 He brought a motion to intervene in a
number of these lawsuits,103 but later withdrew the motion with no
explanation.104

99. See Press Release, Adam Paul Laxalt, Nev. Att’y Gen., Nev. Att’y Gen.
Website, Attorney General Laxalt Files Lawsuit Against Opioid Manufacturer to
Combat
Nevada’s
Opioid
Epidemic
(May
15,
2018),
http://ag.nv.gov/News/PR/2018/Attorney_General_Laxalt_Files_Lawsuit_Against_O
pioid_Manufacturer_to_Combat_Nevada%
E2%
80%
99s_Opioid_Epidemic/
[https://perma.cc/PX5A-7C5N].
100. Riley Snyder & Michelle Rindels, Governor Candidate Schwartz Backs Reno
Opioid Lawsuit, Criticizes Laxalt for Opposing It, NEV. INDEP. (Nov. 14, 2017),
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/governor-candidate-schwartz-backs-renoopioid-lawsuit-criticizes-laxalt-for-opposing-it [https://perma.cc/4BMN-UXWK].
101. City of Reno Files Lawsuits Against Distributors, Manufacturers of Opioids ,
MYNEWS4.COM (Sept. 18, 2018), https://mynews4.com/news/local/city-of-reno-fileslawsuit-against-distributors-manufacturers-of-opioids [https://perma.cc/ZE7K-QJ4L].
102. Fisher, supra note 36. The County claims were filed by county district
attorneys. Press Release, Herbert H. Slattery III, Tenn. Att’y Gen., Tenn. Att’y Gen.
Website,
Statement
on
Opioid
Litigation
(Mar.
21,
2018),
https://www.tn.gov/attorneygeneral/news/2018/3/21/pr18-09.html
[https://perma.cc/5CXU-P4PN].
103. State Attorney General Intervenes in Opioids Lawsuit , INDEP. HERALD
ONEIDA (Mar. 27, 2018), http://ihoneida.com/2018/03/27/state-attorney-generalintervenes-in-opioids-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/RPS3-VRM9].
104. Rain Smith, Tennessee Attorney General Backs off Challenge to Local
Opioid Lawsuit, KINGSPORT TIMES NEWS (Apr. 13, 2018, 10:58 AM),
http://www.timesnews.net/Law-Enforcement/2018/04/13/Attorney-general-backs-offchallenge-to-local-opioid-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/Z85C-75WC].
In a different
context, a city made a similar move—Lake Elmo intervened in Minnesota’s suit
against 3M. Nick Ferraro, Lake Elmo Pulls out of Lawsuit Against 3M, TWIN CITIES
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In Oklahoma, Oklahoma City recently brought an opioid suit on its
own, despite an earlier state suit. While the Oklahoma Attorney
General cautioned that state laws regarding city recovery might
impact the city’s lawsuit, the state’s counsel publicly “wished
Oklahoma City well.”105
Thus, although states have many tools at their disposal to stop
plaintiff city litigation, including entering into their own settlements
with defendants, directly suing cities for orders of dismissal, and
enacting legislation that either expressly or impliedly preempts city
claims, states, for the most part, have not interfered with plaintiff city
litigation.106 Unlike in the regulatory preemption context, states have
generally not sought to confine or circumscribe city litigative power in
a more punitive way than they have before. Neither the tenor nor the
pace of states’ approach to city litigation has tracked the massive
upheaval evident in their overhauled approach to city regulation.
What accounts for the stark difference between state-city battles
over city powers of regulation versus state-city battles over city
powers of litigation? There are three main factors at work. The first
is the states’ history of bipartisan litigation. The second is the
difference in the issues being litigated versus the issues being
regulated. The third is the nature of litigation as a perceived form of
governance.
A. Litigation Bipartisanship
There is almost unanimous scholarly agreement that the rise of
regulatory hyper preemption is fueled by extreme partisan divide.107
Specifically, “[t]he driving cause behind the recent preemption trend

PIONEER
PRESS
(Aug.
13,
2013,
11:01
PM),
https://www.twincities.com/2013/08/13/lake-elmo-pulls-out-of-lawsuit-against-3m/
[https://perma.cc/HU5P-D7P5]. Later, following a turn-over in the local government,
Lake Elmo withdrew in order to “collaborate” with 3M on monitoring. Id. The State
did not publicly take a position on the city’s intervention, but 3M opposed it, on the
basis that what Lake Elmo was doing was analogous to what Dover did in State v.
Dover, 891 A.2d 524 (N.H. 2006). Id.; see also Josephine Marcotty, Minnesota
Settlement with 3M May Fix Drinking Water but Not the Environment, STAR TRIB.
(Mar. 3, 2018, 7:35 PM), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-settlement-with-3mmay-fix-drinking-water-but-not-the-environment/475741593/ [https://perma.cc/HG33GVKA].
105. William Crum, Oklahoma City Council Moves Ahead with Opioid Litigation,
NEWSOK (Aug. 1, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://newsok.com/article/5603264/oklahoma-citycouncil-moves-ahead-with-opioid-litigation [https://perma.cc/2EDQ-JX3L].
106. See supra Part I.
107. See, e.g., Riverstone-Newell, supra note 7, at 407.
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is a striking political phenomenon: Cities across the nation are
becoming more Democratic, while state legislatures are becoming
more Republican.”108
In the litigation context, though, states have often been able to
overcome such extreme partisan divide. The lubricant for this
litigative flexibility has been financial—the prospect of refilling state
coffers and recouping the losses caused by the litigated harms has
historically tended to bridge state partisan gaps.109 Indeed, much of
the large-scale attorney general affirmative litigation against private
industries has been bipartisan.110 For instance, all fifty states were
part of a 2012 settlement with a number of major banks for the
wrongs committed in the aftermath of sub-prime mortgage crisis.111
As scholar Paul Nolette writes in his study of bipartisanship in state
litigation, this bipartisanship is somewhat surprising, given that
Republican attorneys general could be expected to reject state-led
litigation on the grounds that it works against their usual agenda of
deregulation and decreased governmental involvement in private
sector machinations.112 Republicans put this concern aside when it
comes to involvement in litigation, however, because litigation often
results in corporations paying substantial amounts in settlements or
judgments.113 To get a piece of this compensation pie, state attorneys
general must participate in the litigation.114 Thus, even “conservative
Republicans” like Alabama State Attorney General William Pryor,

108. Kenneth A. Stahl, Preemption, Federalism, and Local Democracy, 44
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 133, 136 (2017); see also Riverstone-Newell, supra note 7, at 406
(noting that “[i]f the surge of preemption litigation in recent years has been fueled in
part by efforts of industry groups and conservative organizations to rein in cities, it
can also be attributed to the growing Republican control of state legislatures,
especially after the tide turned in Republicans’ favor during the 2010 elections”).
109. NOLETTE, supra note 22, at 28.
110. Id. (noting that “[p]revious research has indicated that coordinated litigation
against private industries, at least coordinated consumer protection litigation, tends
to attract largely bipartisan participation among AGs”).
111. Jeffrey Stinson, When States Win Lawsuits, Where Does the Money Go,
STATELINE
(Feb.
19,
2015,
4:02
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2015/02/19/stateline-stateslawsuits/23675241/ [https://perma.cc/2TMG-XSKM].
Nolette characterizes the
settlement slightly differently, as a “$26 billion settlement in 2012 with the six largest
national banks to settle investigations into the banks’ role in the mortgage crisis of
the late 2000s.” NOLETTE, supra note 22, at 24.
112. NOLETTE, supra note 22, at 28.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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who decried most forms of state litigation, nonetheless participated in
the tobacco settlement agreement in 1998.115
State litigation bipartisanship was also evident in the early acid rain
cases and in pharmaceutical litigation.116 In the acid rain cases in the
1980s, states tended to form litigation coalitions along “regional,
rather than partisan lines.”117 Similarly, in pharmaceutical litigation,
which makes up “more than one-fifth of all multistate litigation
targeting private industry,” there has been a norm of “bipartisan
cooperation” among state attorneys general.118 Republican buy-in
has been attributed both to the fact that litigation is only “subtly
regulatory” and to the reality that the possibility of participating in
settlements and judgments provides state attorneys general with a
“clear incentive” to join their democratic counterparts.119
These same two factors are also present in plaintiff city litigation.
Cities often sue for damages, and compensation to cities means fuller
municipal coffers, which can indirectly translate into less of a strain
on state budgets.120 Further, plaintiff city litigation is similarly only
subtly regulatory.121
B.

Political Divisiveness

Another factor that likely drives states’ more tolerant approach to
plaintiff city litigation is that the harms cities are litigating over attract
almost universal condemnation. Lead paint poisoning, the sub-prime
mortgage crisis, and the opioid epidemic are all widely acknowledged
to be egregious harms which have caused significant damage to public
health and safety, and which have demanded significant expenditures

115. Id.
116. Id. at 162.
117. Id. at 160. (“What stands out in AGs’ earliest collaborations on acid rain
issues is that these battles were fairly contained and fought more on regional rather
than partisan lines. All of the AGs seeking stricter EPA regulation during the 1980s
represented down-wind Northeastern states, with the exception of Minnesota’s
Hubert Humphrey III. All the AGs who sided with the EPA’s position against new
air pollution controls represented upwind Midwestern or Southern states, with AGs
from other regions sitting on the sidelines. The litigation was bipartisan, as
Democratic and Republican AGs from the Northeast joined in all eight of the
multistate acid rain cases during this period, while they were opposed in two cases by
Democratic AGs representing Midwestern and Southern states.”).
118. Id. at 23–24.
119. Id. at 163.
120. See Swan, supra note 18, at 1280.
121. See id. at 1269.
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from states and cities in response.122 Indeed, states themselves have
also sued (often in bipartisan litigation) over many of these harms.123
In contrast, there is much less consensus regarding issues like the
appropriate scope of the Second Amendment, whether antidiscrimination laws can include sexual orientation without infringing
on religious liberty, and the impact of sanctuary cities on
immigration.124 While some of the city ordinances that have attracted
state regulatory preemption seem ridiculously innocuous, like plastic
bag bans, or sprinkler regulation, many are matters of hotly debated
public contestation.125 While there are many persuasive arguments
for city regulation in these contested areas, city litigation over lesscontentious issues raises substantially less state ire.
C.

Litigation v. Regulation

The final factor softening states’ response to plaintiff city litigation
lies in the nature of litigation itself.
While regulation is a
quintessential power of governing, the link between litigation and
governing is less obvious. First, anyone who has been harmed can
litigate; it is not a uniquely governmental action, and thus is not often
seen as necessarily an exercise of political power.126
Second, there is almost always a large amount of uncertainty
associated with litigation.127 What a court and a jury will ultimately
decide is not under the control of the litigating party. In fact, the vast
majority of plaintiff city litigation has actually thus far achieved only a
few judicial victories.128 The bulk of plaintiff city litigation has been
dismissed on various doctrinal and standing grounds.129 It is thus far
from certain that bringing a claim means winning a claim. Unlike
regulation, litigation is not a simple translation of the city’s will into

122. See id. at 1281–82.
123. Id. at 1253.
124. Hicks et al., supra note 10, at 26.
125. See id. at 1276.
126. State parens patriae litigation may be an exception to this, but cities lack
parens patriae power. See Swan, supra note 18, at 1253.
127. Nevertheless, “[a]lthough the litigation by itself may not always produce
immediate and sweeping results, it can function as part of an effective political
strategy for achieving social reform.” SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, PITIFUL PLAINTIFFS:
CHILD WELFARE LITIGATION AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 5–6 (2000).
128. See Swan, supra note 18, at 1231 (explaining that the expressive and political
value of plaintiff city litigation, however, does not depend on the cases actually
winning).
129. Id. at 1231.
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reality. Instead, that will is mediated by existing law, by courts, and
by juries. Litigation can move the law forward in progressive ways,
but it can also cause it to contract. Parties can try to “make” law
through litigation, but whether or not they will achieve this goal as
intended is always unknown. As a governance tool, then, litigation is
unreliable and subject to the checks and balances of the law as
interpreted and applied by other actors. So far, in the plaintiff city
context, those checks and balances have largely stymied city litigation.
Ultimately, the precise nature of the relationship between
litigation, regulation, and governing is deeply contested. Some forms
of litigation have been linked to future general deterrence, but there
is a dearth of research in this area.130 And although one prominent
scholarly argument insists that litigation is a form of regulation when
industry defendants agree to settlement terms which govern their
future actions, this argument has many detractors.131 The connection,
or lack thereof, between litigation and regulation is often contested in
the implied preemption cases. In the majority of such cases,
defendants in plaintiff city cases argue that, since cities lack the power
to regulate in a particular area, they are impermissibly using litigation
and courts as an end run around this obstacle.132
As one judge pointed out, the problem with this argument is that
the regulatory effect of plaintiff city litigation is essentially equivalent
to the regulatory effect of all litigation.133 Thus, to equate plaintiff
city litigation with regulation would be like saying “that an injured
plaintiff is attempting to regulate the automobile industry when he
sues to recover damages caused by faulty brakes, or that a survivor is
attempting to regulate the airline industry when he sues the airline
because his spouse was killed in an airplane crash.”134 However,

130. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Actions Deter Wrongdoing? 195
(Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No.
17-40, 2018).
131. But see, e.g., Morial v. Smith & Wesson, 785 So. 2d 1, 20 (La. 2001) (Calogero,
J., dissenting). See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION
(2002).
132. Laura L. Gavioli, Comment, Who Should Pay: Obstacles to Cities in Using
Affirmative Litigation as a Source of Revenue, 78 TUL. L. REV. 941, 952 (2004). To
be sure, cities often explicitly indicate that they are looking to litigate because a
governance gap has allowed the harm to flourish. See, e.g., Swan, supra note 18, at
1269; see also Lisa Vanhala & Chris Hilson, Climate Change Litigation: Symposium
Introduction, L. & POL’Y 141, 143 (2013).
133. Morial, 785 So.2d at 20.
134. Id.

2018]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

1265

other courts have held that this is just so—all private party common
law actions are in fact regulatory.135 Despite these debates, one thing
that is clear is that litigation is not as obviously regulatory as
regulation itself, and this fact seems to have contributed to the
tolerance of plaintiff city litigation.
III. THE SPACE FOR PLAINTIFF CITY LITIGATION
Generally speaking, then, states have left cities with a significant
amount of litigation leeway. Within this space, cities are able to
achieve some of the same kinds of progressive ends as they seek to
promote through regulation. Obviously, the many private plaintiffs’
attorneys who often partner with plaintiff cities and pursue claims on
a contingency fee basis136 likely believe that plaintiff city claims can
and will achieve success at some point, particularly because they can,
and often do, serve as a source of revenue for the city.137 But
regardless of potential success, plaintiff city claims themselves have
political value: They serve as a means by which cities express political
values and define their polities.138
Plaintiff cities tend to litigate issues that have their most
detrimental impact on vulnerable populations.139 For example, much
of the plaintiff city activity has occurred in the areas of gun violence,
lead paint poisoning, environmental harms, and the sub-prime
mortgage crisis. These areas all have significant racial dimensions.140
Gun violence is a public harm that disproportionately affects African
American and Hispanic communities—members of both communities
are statistically much more likely than whites to be the victims of gun
violence.141 Similarly, lead paint poisoning is a disease that has been

135. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 325 (2008).
136. Swan, supra note 18, at 1280.
137. Id. at 1282 (“Plaintiff city claims can serve as a source of revenue . . . . Many of
the parties targeted in plaintiff city claims significantly contributed to the city’s
distress: part of the very reason why many cities are in financial distress connects to
the wrongs alleged in plaintiff city litigation.”).
138. See id. at 1280, 1285.
139. Id. at 1246.
140. Id. at 1246–48.
141. See Roberto A. Ferdman, The Racial Divide in America’s Gun Deaths,
WASH.
POST
(Sept.
19,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/19/the-racial-divide-inamericas-gun-deaths/?utm_term=.4e4b25482a14
[https://perma.cc/6DK5-672C].
Ferdman notes that “[b]etween 2000 and 2010, the death rate due to firearm-related
injuries was more than 18.5 per 100,000 among blacks, but only nine per 100,000
among whites.” See also Josh Sugarmann, Gun Violence Kills More than 3,000
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“largely eliminated” in wealthy white neighborhoods, and now
“primarily impacts African-Americans” in poorer areas.142 Indeed,
environmental harms more broadly are racialized, as a comprehensive
study from Harvard University confirmed when it found that in
America, “black people are about three times more likely to die from
exposure to airborne pollutants than others.”143 The subprime
mortgage crisis follows a similar pattern, with its heaviest impact on
minority
populations,
specifically
on
African
American
homeowners.144
Additionally, another active area of plaintiff city litigation – opioid
litigation – mostly impacts yet another vulnerable population: the
disabled.145 Patients experiencing pain and difficulty functioning are

Hispanics Per Year, New Study Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 6, 2015),

https://www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-sugarmann/gun-violence-kills-moret_b_7948560.html [https://perma.cc/UY25-BZXL].
142. See Alissa Scheller & Erin Schumaker, Lead Poisoning Is Still a Public
Health Crisis for African-Americans, HUFFINGTON POST LIFE: WELLNESS BLOG (July
13, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/13/black-children-at-risk-for-leadpoisoning-_n_7672920.html [https://perma.cc/SQ8N-Z3S6] (“According to the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, children of color whose families are
poor and who live in housing built before 1950 have the highest lead poisoning
risk.”); see also Michael Hawthorne, Lead Paint Poisons Poor Chicago Kids as City
Spends Millions Less on Clean Up, CHI. TRIB. (May 1, 2015),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-lead-poisoning-chicago-met-20150501story.html [https://perma.cc/G8SR-RUEF].
143. See Julia Craven, Even Breathing Is a Risk in One of Orlando’s Poorest
Neighborhoods,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Jan.
23,
2018),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/florida-poor-black-neighborhood-airpollution_us_5a663a67e4b0e5630072746e [https://perma.cc/DAL4-TADF].
144. David D. Troutt, Disappearing Neighbors, 123 HARV. L. REV. F. 21, 24 (2010);
Kathleen S. Morris, Cities Seeking Justice: Local Government Litigation in the Public
Interest, in THE HOW CITIES WILL SAVE THE WORLD: URBAN INNOVATION IN THE
FACE OF POPULATION FLOWS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 195
(Ray Brescia & John Travis Marshall eds., 2016); see also Kathleen C. Engel, Local
Governments and Risky Home Loans, 69 SMU L. REV. 609, 630 (2016)
(“Communities of color have been hit hardest by foreclosures because many
predatory and subprime lenders targeted people of color with the worst loans.”).
145. Ironically, racism actually ended up protecting minority populations from
opioid addiction. Put bluntly, “[b]lacks have been undertreated for pain for
decades,” since “physicians’ prejudice leads many to prescribe opioids at a lower rate
to black and Latino patients than to whites.” Steven Ross Johnson, The Racial
Divide in the Opioid Crisis, MOD. HEALTHCARE (Feb. 24, 2016),
http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160224/NEWS/160229947
[https://perma.cc/G3F4-W396]; see also Sophie Gilbert, “Warning: This Drug May
Kill You” Offers a Close-Up of the Opioid Epidemic, ATLANTIC (May 1, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/05/warning-this-drug-maykill-you-opioid-epidemic-hbo/524982/ [https://perma.cc/2XN5-AGQM]. However,
that gap is now closing. See Josh Katz & Abby Goodnough, The Opioid Crisis Is
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the most common victims of opioid addictions, and a recent study
suggests that patients with certain mental disorders are significantly
more likely to receive long-term opioid prescriptions, creating a
situation where “[t]he very folks who are most vulnerable to opioids’
deadliest effects are unusually likely to get a long-term supply of the
drugs.”146
In bringing litigation in these areas and demanding redress for
harms impacting vulnerable and minority populations, cities are
affirming the place and inherent value of these groups within the
polity.147 Plaintiff city litigation has specific, expressive value both to
members of those harmed communities and beyond. Cities are
signalling to impacted community members that they have not been
abandoned or discarded, instead they are an important component of
the “collective project of making the social world.”148 Rather than
contributing to the “legal estrangement” that racial minorities and
vulnerable communities experience on many fronts,149 plaintiff city
litigation promotes the progressive ideal of “democratic equality,”
broadcasting to corporate wrongdoers and the world outside the city’s
borders that “there is not a class or group of persons who are
somehow entitled to mistreat another, ‘lower’ class or group.”150
Plaintiff city litigation is a “public action with political significance,” a
significance not necessarily determined by winning or losing, but by
whether the litigation “widens the public imagination about right and
wrong,” “mobilizes political action behind new social arrangements,”
or both.151

Getting Worse, Particularly for Black Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/22/upshot/opioid-deaths-are-spreadingrapidly-into-black-america.html [https://perma.cc/M8ES-8JTH].
146. Francie Diep, We’re Giving the Most Vulnerable People the Most Potent
Opioid Painkiller Prescriptions, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://psmag.com/news/were-giving-the-most-vulnerable-people-the-most-potentopioid-painkiller-prescriptions [https://perma.cc/HLB3-FLQP].
147. Swan, supra note 18, at 1287.
148. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement ,
126 YALE L.J. 2054, 2085 (2017).
149. Id.
150. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 917, 982 (2010).
151. John O. Calmore, Chasing the Wind: Pursuing Social Justice, Overcoming
Legal Mis-Education, and Engaging in Professional Re-Socialization, 37 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1167, 1198–99 (2004) (quoting Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessons
from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 699, 758–59 (1988)).
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Plaintiff city litigation is part of a larger struggle for local political
ordering, and although it may not be able to achieve the exact same
goals as local regulation, it can nonetheless serve some of the same
broad purposes.152 Many of the preempted ordinances are rooted in
goals of equity, diversity, and democracy— plaintiff city litigation
largely shares these goals.153 And because states have been generally
tolerant of plaintiff city litigation and have left a space for it, even as
they aggressively attack local regulations, plaintiff city litigation offers
an alternative path for cities seeking to advance progressive goals
within these troubling state parameters.
CONCLUSION
Like the expressive meaning of plaintiff city litigation, regulatory
preemption also has an important signalling function. The new
regulatory preemption laws are “a signal to cities . . . that they are
powerless to find their own solutions to issues that directly impact
them.”154 But while it is true that the new preemption laws pose a
significant problem for local governance, cities are not completely
powerless. There is resistance.155 Cities have directly challenged
regulatory preemption laws in the courtrooms and there is hope for
some success.156

152. For example, Birmingham’s minimum wage ordinance, which Alabama
preempted, also involved racial equality issues. As Max Rivlin-Nadar wrote:
The racial optics are also hard to miss. Birmingham is almost 75 percent
black; the state as a whole is 75 percent white. In preempting wage
legislation, the state government is tamping down a movement led primarily
by black service workers and perpetuating the inequality that has kept
Birmingham among the most segregated cities in America.

Preemption Bills: A New Conservative Tool to Block Minimum Wage Increases ,
NEW REPUBLIC (Feb. 29, 2016).
153. These are the goals of the just city, as articulated in Susan S. Fainstein,
Planning and the Just City, in SEARCHING FOR THE JUST CITY: DEBATES IN URBAN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 19 (Peter Marcuse et al. eds., 2009). See also Swan, supra
note 18, at 1288–90.
154. Franklin R. Guenthner, Note, Reconsidering Home Rule and City-State
Preemption in Abandoned Fields of Law, 102 MINN. L. REV. 427, 429 (2017).
155. As Michel Foucault theorized, “[w]here there is power, there is resistance.” 1
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 95 (1978).
156. Capps, supra note 12 (describing how the city of Cleveland challenged a state
law that purported to preempt “a 12-year-old municipal law that requires contractors
to hire locally” and how the city of Birmingham is challenging an Alabama law aimed
at “preempting local minimum-wage increases”).
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And cities still have some space to maneuver in the litigation
context. While states have been eager to preempt cities from
engaging in regulation, they have been markedly less inclined to stop
cities’ litigative efforts. States have the ability to preempt city
litigation through various means, including by entering into
settlement agreements with industry actors, directly suing cities, or
through legislation targeting city litigation; but they have not
escalated their use of these tools, despite the hundreds of plaintiff city
claims currently pending. Although plaintiff city litigation cannot
resolve the highly contentious social issues which are on the frontline
of new super or nuclear preemption laws, plaintiff city litigation still
provides a parallel path for some cities to advance broad goals of
urban social justice. It has expressive and political value, and even in
this era of bitter divide between many cities and states, it remains a
viable option for many localities.

